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TANF AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE AUTONOMY OF
INDIGENT SINGLE MOTHERS
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, New York Times correspondent Jason DeParle
researched the effects of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)' on the lives of welfare
recipients.2 In an interview with AdvoCasey, the Annie E. Casey
Foundation's policy magazine, DeParle commented that the theory
behind the 1996 welfare reform bill was "that if we can get women
into the workforce, it will benefit their kids both in economic and
non-economic ways: it'll create positive role models, inject new order
into family life, motivate kids to study and work hard themselves."'
DeParle's observation of three families receiving welfare benefits
suggests these high expectations are not necessarily being met in
the lives of actual welfare recipients." He comments:
it sure doesn't seem that way in most of the families I've gotten
to know. In the three families I'm following, I would have to say
that welfare reform has meant almost nothing for the kids. There
may be a little bit more money, and a little bit more pride in the
mothers, but there's also more stress, and there's more
unsupervised time for adolescents in a neighborhood where
there's lots of trouble to get into.5
PRWORA, welfare reform legislation that President Bill Clinton
signed into law in August 1996, "changed the structure of income
support for poor single-parent families. .. .' Supporters believed
that passing the bill would accomplish two goals.7 The economic goal
was to ostensibly place impoverished welfare mothers on the road
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193,110 Stat. 2106 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. The Story Behind The Welfare Story: An Interview with New York Times
Correspondent Jason DeParle, ADvOCASEY: DOCuMENTING PROGRAMS THAT WORK FOR KIDS
AND FAMILIEs, Summer 2002, at 32 [hereinafter DeParle Interviewl, available at
http:j/www.aecf.org/publications/advocasey/summer2002/story/.
3. Id. at 37.
4. Id. at 35.
5. Id. at 37-38.
6. JANICE PETERSON, ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL'Y RES., LIFE AlTER WELFARE
REFORM: Low-INcoME SINGLE PARENT FAMLIS, PR&E AND POST-TANF 1 (2002), available at
httpj/www.iwpr.org/pdf/d446.pdf.
7. See SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN: WOMEN IN THE AGE OF WELFARE
REFORM 18-19 (2003) (arguing that there are two conflicting visions of work and family life
embedded in PRWORA, which she terms the "Work Plan" and the "Family Plan").
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to economic self-sufficiency by placing them in the workforce.' A
second, more invidious goal of PRWORA was to reduce out-of-
wedlock pregnancies, promote marriage as a route off welfare, and
allow children to be 'cared for at home. 9 Essentially, "the PRWOR]A
extends the inveterate moral prescriptivity of welfare policy, and to
back up its prescriptions it provides the economic sanction of work
outside the home."10
This note addresses the defects of the caseload reduction focus
of PRWORA and how it actually frustrates the main goal of
economic relief to impoverished families. First, the note will give
background information into the policies informing the 1996 welfare
reform. Second, the note will analyze the adverse cumulative effect
of the welfare-to-work and the family formation components of
welfare reform and how they frustrate the goal of self-sufficiency.
Next, the note will explore the autonomy argument critique of the
family planning prong of PRWORA and its constitutional
implications. Finally, the note will argue that by adjusting the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program's focus to
fulfill the need rather than forcefully promote a normative social
goal, the program will better meet the needs of indigent women and
their children. If welfare legislation were more responsive to need,
the system would be better equipped to achieve the ultimate
economic goal of self-sufficiency. As for the social reform rationale
of the TANF legislation, the government should not interfere with
a woman's ability to live free from unwarranted intrusion into the
domestic sphere." To this end, a welfare model must be created that
maximizes the ability of welfare recipients to make autonomous decisions.
8. Id. But see MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK, FIGHTING BACK WOMEN AND WELFARE
IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (2000) (arguing "[t]he anti-welfare rhetoric masked one of the
underlying reasons for the attack on ADC: the competing demand for women's unpaid labor
in the home and their low-paid labor in the market").
9. HAYS, supra note 7, at 19 (discussing Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2110,(1996)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 601, et. seq.)); see also THE LEWIN GROUP, INC. for the ASSiSTAN'r
SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DEP't OFHEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, STATE
EXPERIENCE AND PERSPECTIVES ON REDUCING OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS (February 2003),
available at http:J/aspe.hhs.govfhspinonmarital-births03.
10. GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 43 (1998).
11. See Jared Bernstein & Mark Greenberg, Reforning Welfare Reform, 12AM. PROSPECT
10, 14 (2001) (arguing that improvement of economic well-being for poor families with
children should be the goal of welfare reform). But see Hearing on Welfare Reform Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 50-84
(2001) (statement of Robert Rector, Senior Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation) (arguing that
the family formation goals of TANF are its most fundamental goals).
TANF AND INDIGENT SINGLE MOTHERS
THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM LAW AND UNDERLYING POLIcY DEBATE
Ann Shola Orloff argues that the 1996 welfare reform consists
of three major components.' First, it eliminated both the social
right and caregiving as bases for presenting claims. 3 Second, it
expanded the role of the market in providing single parents with
income and childcare." Finally, it shifted toward gender sameness
because the policy expectations for mothers were the same as those
for fathers, namely employment."5 The legislation replaced Aid to
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), citing as one of its primary
rationales the significant reduction of the welfare caseload.' The
means chosen to achieve this end included eliminating entitlements
to federal cash assistance and imposing time limits for federal aid. 7
It also placed caps on extending benefits for children conceived while
receiving welfare, and gave states wide latitude to create "work-
based safety-nets" for poor families with children.' In theory, all of
these measures should have led to the increased self-sufficiency and
autonomy of former welfare recipients. 9 Yet, under the 1996
legislation, once a family reaches its five-year lifetime limit on
benefits, there is no guarantee of a job. Even when a qeaver' does
find a job, it is likely to be a low wage job with few or no benefits.20
As a result, many impoverished single mothers suffered an abrupt
loss of welfare assistance without the corresponding means to self-
sufficiency. This portion of the legislation garnered some of the most
12. Ann Shola Orloff, Ending the Entitlements of Poor Single Mothers: Changing Social
Policies, Women's Employment, and Caregiving in the Contemporary United States, in
WOMEN AND WELFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 133,134




16. PETERSON, ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
17. See generally CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. POL'Y, KEY PROVISIONS IN TANF
REAUTHORIZATION BILLS PASSED BY THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE
(2003), available at http.//www.clasp.org(Pubs/DMS/Documents/1064343116.03/Summary
_SBS.pdf (highlighting the similarities and differences among the AFDC, the Senate
Finance Bill that would amend it, and the House Bill that would do the same).
18. HAYS, supra note 7, at 27.
19. See The Needs of the Working Poor: Helping Working Families Make Ends Meet Before
the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions 106th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Heather Boushey) [hereinafter Boushey] available at http//www.epinet.org/printer.
cfm?id=98&contenttype=1.
20. INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL'Y RESEARCH, BEFORE AND AFTER WELFARE: THE WORK AND
WELL-BEING OF LOW-INCOME SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES, FACT SHEET (2003), available at
httpj/www.iwpr.orglpdf/D459.pdf.
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heated criticism from liberal camps.21 A study done by the Institute for
Women's Policy Research (IWPR) in September 2002, six years after
the PRWORA became law, showed that "[dlespite the increased
work effort of their parents and declining poverty overall, family
income declined for extremely poor children between 1996 and
2000."' Conversely, proponents of the welfare reform legislation
pointed triumphantly to the decline in the number of families
receiving public assistance.'
THE FAMILY FORMATION PRONG AND ITS
ENCROACHMENT ON AUTONOMY
The family formation component of PRWORA is particularly
troublesome from an autonomy perspective because it aims to
impose a uniform standard for proper familial behavior upon
citizens.' Mink argues that PRWORA is an "unapologetic imposition
of moral stipulations" and a "bold appropriation of the police
power."' Such a robust exercise of police power raises equal
protection issues, because only that segment of the population
receiving government benefits is subjected to such intrusion on
family life.26 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
21. See AMERICAN FEDERATED STATE COUNTY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, THE IMPACT
OF THE NEW FEDERAL WELFARE LAW ON CHILD WELFARE SERVICES (2002), at http//www.af
scme.org/publications/child/cww98107.htm [hereinafter FEDERATED EMPLOYEES]; see also
HAYS, supra note 7, at 16.
But the provision of welfare reform that gives work requirements real teeth...
is the federal time limits on benefits .... [AI1 welfare recipients are expected
to be self sufficient - and no matter how destitute they might be, they will
remain ineligible to receive welfare assistance for the rest of their lives.
Id.
22. DEANNA M. LYTER, ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLY RES., CHILDREN IN SINGLE-
PARENT FAMILIES LIVING IN POVER'Y HAVE FEWER SUPPORTS AFTER WELFARE REFORM 4-5
(2002), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/d45l.pdf (noting that for children younger
than six living in extreme poverty, family income declined from $380 to $301 per month).
23. JANICE PETERSON, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL'Y RES., FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
TANF REAUTHORIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE OF WELFARE
REFORM (2002), available at http'/www.iwpr.orgepdfe51.htm (noting that "[bly the time of
TANF's passage in August of 1996, caseloads had declined to 4.4 million families" (from a
peak of 5 million families in 1994) and, 'after the passage of TANF the rate of decline in the
caseload escalated, falling to 2.5 million families by June 1999- a 50 percent decline since
the peak in 1994").
24. FEDERATED EMPLOYEES, supra note 21; see also HAYS, supra note 7, at 65. ("In a
parallel to the work requirements, welfare policies aimed at instilling proper familial
behavior are designed to reflect a cultural image of how all people should behave with
respect to childbearing, childrearing, marriage, and family.").
25. MINK, supra note 10, at 64.
26. Id. at 94.
TANF AND INDIGENT SINGLE MOTHERS
Constitution states "[n] o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."27 If the laws governing welfare subject recipients to
an undue amount of governmental control, the equal protection concerns
are justified.2 When an individual signs up for government
assistance, it is not a given that she also intends to sign away her
ability to act autonomously. Hays notes this overly paternalistic
treatment of welfare recipients "is a notable exception to our strong
cultural and constitutional prohibitions against state interference in
private lives, particularly familial behavior.' It also reveals assumed
biases against welfare mothers, particularly that they are socially
deviant and require punitive measures to discourage their pathological
predisposition to bear children in order to receive increased benefits.3°
Welfare recipients and the working poor lack the political platform
upon which to voice their displeasure with the system that so
intimately affects them. Their powerlessness makes it nearly
impossible for them to refute the myth of their irresponsibility and
pathological dependency upon the system. Unfortunately, unfavorable
stereotypes of welfare mothers as cheating 'welfare queens' and
immoral women encourage the acceptance of intrusive and punitive
policies against welfare beneficiaries.31
THE PRWORA HISTORY
Enacted in 1996 as a result of heated political debate, the
PRWORA fulfilled President Clinton's 1992 campaign promise to
"end welfare as we know it." The bill was the culmination of
extensive debate in which Republicans and Democrats put forth
opposing ideas about how to reform welfare policy. Democrats
tended to favor reform through welfare-to-work programs while
keeping intact the basic concept of entitlement to assistance. On
the other side of the political aisle, most Republicans wanted to
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. MINK, supra note 10, at 92.
29. HAYS, supra note 7, at 66.
30. See generally RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM (Sanford F. Schram, et
al. eds., 2003) (discussing the history of welfare and its impact on the politics of race).
31. See generally Holloway Sparks, Queens, Teens, and Model Mothers: Race, Gender, and
the Discourse of Welfare Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 171
(Sanford F. Schram, et al. eds. 2003).
32. Kathleen J. Casey & Susan J. Carroll, Welfare Reform in the 104th Congress:
Institutional Position and the Role of Women, in WOMEN & WELFARE: THEORYAND PRACTICE
IN THE UNTrED STATES AND EUROPE 111, 111 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Uhrike Liebert eds.,
2001) (citing CONG. Q. 2,696 (Sept. 21, 1996)).
33. Id. at 117.
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dismantle welfare, particularly AFDC, and shift the burden of
providing assistance from the federal government to the states.3'
Conservatives wanted strict work requirements as a way of
reforming the perceived deviance of poor, inner-city mothers.35
Conservative policy makers and political operatives charged that
welfare "encouraged perverse behavioral choices, flouted the
obligations of citizenship, and undermined the voluntarism of civil
society.' Ironically, the arguments for the sweeping welfare reform
were buttressed by the ideals of personal freedom and privacy
espoused so vigorously in the United States' legal tradition.
The 1996 welfare reform significantly altered the federal
funding structure of public assistance.3" Under AFDC, the federal
government matched state expenditures on welfare programs,
whereas TANF, AFDC's replacement, relieved the federal
government of this expense.38 After the 1996 reform, each state
received a lump sum of federal funds, contingent upon the state's
meeting a maintenance-of-effort requirement. 9 PRWORA also gave
states increased discretion in using TANF funds and designing
programs with those funds.'3 Under TANF, federal funding does not
fluctuate based on caseload changes.' 1 Instead, the formerly open-
ended grant became a block grant with a spending cap of $16.5
billion annually.'2 The allocation was based on 1994-95 caseload
amounts, which decreased nationwide in the ensuing years.' This
new setup gave state governments an incentive to reduce caseloads to
yield a financial surplus they could then reallocate in any manner
they deemed appropriate." Federal entitlements to cash welfare
were also cut by TANF.4' Under AFDC, all families whose income
34. Id.
35. Michael Brown, Gettos, Fiscal Federalism, and Welfare Reform, in RACE AND THE
POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 47, 47 (Sanford F. Schram, et al. eds., 2003).
36. Sanford F. Schram & Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy Discourse and
the Politics of Research, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. (2001) (citing generally JEAN
STEFANCIC, ET AL., NO MERCY: HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS
CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996)).
37. CTI. FOR LAW & SOC. POL'Y, supra note 17.
38. See id.
39. See id.





45. Id. at 48.
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fell below certain state income standards were entitled to cash
assistance.' Under the new plan, these families must meet certain
work requirements to be eligible for such assistance.47
The goals of PRWORA and TANF are four-fold." First, the
overarching goal is to provide relief to families living below the
poverty line.49 Second, TANF seeks to end dependence of needy
parents by promoting work and marriage.'0 Third, PRWORA is
aimed at encouraging the formation and maintenance of two parent
families. 1 The final goal of PRWORA is to encourage the formation
and maintenance of two parent families.52
PRWORA aims to promote the standard two parent family
model to poor mothers.5 In its November 2001 letter to Health and
Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson, the ACLU
vehemently criticized this social reform component, arguing that the
"[viarious requirements under the current TANF program require
recipients to submit to certain family structures and relationships
upon penalty of losing benefits" should be rejected in the
reauthorization legislation that is still pending." Some feminist
scholars like Gwendolyn Mink would argue that welfare reform not
only attempts to change the lifestyle of single mothers, but also
punishes single mothers for those lifestyle choices.' This objective
assumes that poor mothers make the conscious decision to deviate
from the two parent model.56 It also gives the federal government
the power to prescribe a national family model, which offends
traditional constitutional values of privacy in the domestic sphere.
Mink observes that the work requirements blatantly reward
marriage by not forcing mothers in two parent families to work
outside the home, even if their families need welfare to make ends
46. Id.
47. Id. at 50.





53. See generally, MINK, supra note 10 (discussing welfare reform and its effect on
indigent mothers).
54. Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Tommy Thompson, Secretary, Dep't
of Health and Human Serv. (November 2001), available at http://archive.aclu.org/
congressall3001a.html (regarding TANF program).
55. MINK, supra note 10, at 105.
56. JANE G. MAULDON, ET AL., WELFARE REFORM AND FAMILY FORMATION PROJECT,
WHAT Do THEY THI N WaLFARE REIP m' ATTImUDEs TowARD MARRIAGE AND
CHILDBEARING 1 (2002), available at www.abtassociates.com/wrffproject.
2004] 159
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meet.57 Mink concludes "the PR[WOR]A's work provisions permit
full-time care-giving where there are two parents, but forbid it
where there is only one."58
Mink's misgivings about PRWORA are characteristic of the
general feminist critique of the 1996 welfare reform.59 It is likely
that liberal feminists would not find the work requirement so
offensive if it were applied evenhandedly.' The disparate treatment of
single mothers strongly suggests that the work requirement is
merely a means of legislating morality obscured by the rhetoric of
"individual responsibility."6' Mink argues "[tihe differential based
on marital status in the application of work requirements is further
evidence that the PR[WORIA's primary goal is to restore the system
of gender relations in which men pay for families while women raise
them."62 Aside from the serious constitutional problems this goal
raises, it also leads to policies that fail to optimally respond to the
needs of the citizens PRWORA was intended to help. In an attempt
to balance the day-to-day caregiving duties of parenting with the
'breadwinning' duties, the single mother is essentially forced to form
a two parent family unit with a male wage earner to make ends
meet and take care of her children.'
AUTONOMY AND ECONOMIC PRIVATION
Autonomy is one of the crucial foundations of the American legal
tradition.' Citizenship is frequently presupposed in American
society, and is often defined in terms of a reciprocal relationship
between a citizen and the greater society.' Essentially, in our
capitalist society, citizenship presupposes participation in the
national economy." Further discussing the assumptions of
citizenship, Joan C. Tronto urges us to "recall ... the Aristotelian
model of the citizen as one who participates in public life, but whose
actual conditions of life presuppose a separate realm of existence in
57. MINK, supra note 10, at 106.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 106.
62. Id
63. Id. at 107.
64. See generally Nancy J. Hirschmann, A Question of Freedom, A Question of Rights?
Women and Welfare, in WOMEN & WELFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND EURoPE 84, (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Ulrike Liebert eds., 2001).
66. ld.
66. Id.
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which economic activity and the work of care go on.' In order for a
socioeconomic system to have the productive citizens it requires,
there must be a separate sphere - the domestic sphere - in which
current and future citizens are reared and maintained.6
Often, welfare recipients - predominantly poor women - are
constructively denied autonomy and citizenship because of the
unstated requirement to contribute to the national economy.6" Part
of this relates to the double-edged sword of redistributive action:
"[W]hile [it] ... can mitigate poverty, such redistribution... may,
on the one hand, undermine a citizen's sense of participation in
community and so undermine the citizen's sense of self-worth.""0
Those who benefit from redistributive policy must also deal with the
perception of their peers that they are somehow less important
because they receive aid from the government."1 The inherent biases
against those who receive government assistance are compounded
when those recipients are predominantly mothers. 2
Yet another reason for the lack of autonomy for poor mothers
involves the dismissive attitude toward the work of mothers as
caregivers.73 As it stands, caregiving work is not recognized as
productive economic activity.74 Martha Fineman argues that
caregiving is a sort of unrecognized subsidy:
Within families there is an entrenched system of injustice, found in
the important, but invisible, type of subsidy of uncompensated
family labor .... This is the subsidy of time and energy that
occurs when others sacrifice market participation in order to
facilitate the endeavors and success of those for whom they care.
Caretaking work is taken for granted. Labor overwhelmingly
supplied by women working as mothers, wives and daughters is
not considered in calculating the gross national product.75
67. Joan C. Tronto, Who Cares? Public and Private Caring and the Rethinking of
Citizenship, in WOMEN & WELFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 65, 66 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Ulrike Liebert eds., 2001).
68. Id. at 68-70.
69. See id. at 66 (arguing the contemporary U.S. model of citizenship presumes the
citizen as a worker).
70. Eva Feder Kittay, From Welfare to Public Ethic Care, in WOMEN AND WELFARE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE iN THE UNrED STATES AND EUROPE 38,43 (Nancy J. Hirschmann &
Ulrike Liebert eds., 2001).
71. Id.
72. Mink, supra note 10, at 23.
73. Id. at 22-23.
74. Id.
75. Martha Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform" at http/Avww.
scu.edu/ethics/publications/other/lawreview/dependencies.html (last visited October 24, 2004).
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This is a critical issue, since assumptions regarding the merits
of certain activities carry a lot of weight in shaping policy:
By offering protection against specified income risks, the welfare
state operates to valorize certain activities and to integrate some
into the economic order, while excluding others. For example,
protection against the income risks associated with employment
both socializes and normalizes the experience of wage earners
.... [F]ailure to provide income security for carers results in
marginalization from the economic order. 6
This marginalization is further proof that caregiving labor is not
recognized as essential to the functioning of businesses and
governments." Mink argues that "loInce we establish that all
caregiving is work, whatever the racial, marital, or class status of
the caregiver, we can build a case for economic arrangements that
enable poor single mothers to do their jobs.""8 As many feminist
theorists argue, caregiving is recognized as an economic activity
when wage-earning mothers pay for childcare.7 9 By recognizing
caregiving as a valid economic activity, there would be no need to
condition benefits on working outside the home, because caregiving
would count as a 'work activity' for the purpose of receiving benefits.
Mink argues "[wle need to redefine welfare in this way to enable
equality .... Income support for all caregivers who are going it
alone would permit them to decide how best to manage their
responsibilities to children.' s° If women are paid when they work as
nannies and babysitters, then no stigma should be attached to poor
caregiving mothers for receiving welfare benefits when they do the
same work for their own children."' Mink states "[r]emuneration for
mothers' caregiving work ought not to be too difficult to calculate, for
much of the work done by mothers already has a market price if
performed for someone else's family." 2
This reconceptualization of welfare's focus would reduce the
76. MARY DALY & KATHERINE RAM, GENDER AND THE WELFARE STATE 94 (2003).
77. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Dependencies, in WOMEN & WELFARE: THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 23,27 (Nancy J. Hirscbmann & Ulrike Liebert
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Fineman, Dependencies] (arguing that "[ajll of us benefit directlyand
indirectly from the reproduction of our society that occurs in the home").
78. MINK, supra note 10, at 134 (emphasis in original).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 137.
81. Id. at 135.
82. Id. at 29. Mink also argues, however, that the value legislators choose to assign to
caregiving as an economic activity may also be dependent upon the race and class of the
caregiver. Id. at 28.
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invasive nature of PRWORA on poor women's lives. Rather than
setting the achievement of certain social norms as the program's
goal, "the only condition government could reasonably impose on a
care-giver's income is whether the labor is, in fact, done. A
caregiving mother's income would not depend on her private moral
choices or on her cultural practices... ."' The concept of economic
remuneration for caregiving work by mothers is not new; in fact,
welfare was originally designed "more than eighty years ago as an
income alternative to a market wage for solo mothers, so that they
could work in the home raising their own children."' The so-called
'mother's pension' of the early twentieth century also subjected
needy mothers to moral worthiness and cultural assimilation
requirements.6 A return to the concept of subsidizing a mother's
caregiving responsibilities without such requirements could actually
give impoverished women a choice in how to conduct their households.
WELFARE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY
One way to make welfare more responsive to the needs of
indigent mothers is to conceive it in terms of positive liberty."M The
distinction between positive and negative liberty goes back to the
great German philosopher Immanuel Kant. 7 Negative liberty is
defined as the absence of external constraints on action."M Positive
liberty, on the other hand, is the possibility of acting in such a way
as to take control of one's life and realize one's fundamental
purposes.89 Currently, PRWORA conveys a negative liberty in
response to the plight of indigent women.' This implies that moving
women into the workforce will free them from the external
constraints of poverty that act upon them. Conversely, positive
liberty posits the provision of "conditions necessary to take
advantage of negative liberties .... ." Hirschmann argues that
welfare reform policy frustrates the requirements of positive liberty:
83. Id. at 137.
84. Id. at 44.
85. Id. at 45.
86. Hirschmann, supra note 64, at 85.
87. Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2003)
available at http'//plato.stanford.edu/entriesiberty-positive-negative (last visited October
24, 2004).
88. Hirschmann, supra note 64, at 86.
89. Carter, supra note 87.
90. Hirschmann, supra note 64, at 84.
91. Id. at 86.
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It may be for this reason that programs such as workfare -
where, in the supposed interest of making welfare recipients
independent... taxpaying citizens, recipients are forced to take
low-wage, dead-end jobs that provide little if any training in
skills ... which could lead to economic independence... - do
not actually fulfill the criteria of positive liberty; can anyone
honestly believe that my true will is to perform mindless
minimum wage labor rather than pursue a college degree which
would enable me to obtain a much higher-paying and
intellectually stimulating job... ?9
Rather than pushing women into a workfare system, women can
achieve more positive liberty if welfare policy is restructured to
center around care rather than work.9' Refocusing welfare in this
manner would not subvert the current policy goal of reducing the
welfare caseload since the idea of self-sufficiency and entering the
workforce is embodied within the idea of enabling women to care for
their families. Mink similarly suggests:
[wle should not think of welfare as a subsidy for dependence; nor
should we think of it as an income substitute for the wage earned
by breadwinners - fathers - in the labor market. Rather, we
should reconceive welfare as the income owed to persons who
work inside the home caring for, nurturing, and protecting
children."
Rather than the superficial goal of just reducing the caseload -
which alleviates the symptom rather than cures the illness -
shifting the focus to care would actually enable poor women's
autonomy.' Such an approach appreciates the fact that poor women
will never exercise their autonomy without first having substantial
enabling policies, such as access to childcare, to assist them in their
effort to become self-sufficient, productive members of society.
PRWORA, and welfare in general, was supposed to be the great
leap to self-sufficiency for millions of poor mothers." Couched in
these terms, welfare reform could be construed as the government's
attempt to encourage the autonomy and personal freedom of poor
92. Id. at 102.
93. Id. at 104.
94. MINK, supra note 10, at 19.
95. Id. at 137.
96. Hirschmann, supra note 64, at 84 ('[Wlelfare can, at least in theory, be seen as a
series of programs developed as a resource to empower citizens, to enable them to liberate
themselves from certain restrictive conditions such as poverty, unemployment, old age, poor
health.").
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mothers currently dependent on the system.' Commentators charge
"[tlhe 1996 welfare reform emphasized the 'work first' approach, and
most states gave priority to helping welfare recipients find a job, but
placed little emphasis on education and job training."0 Though
empowering in theory, welfare in practice has fallen short of these
high-flying notions of autonomy:
In practice, welfare often seems more about institutionalizing
social control over women than liberating them from economic
destitution or empowering them to be economically independent.
Feminists agree that "being on welfare" (in U.S. parlance)
involves strict and intrusive scrutiny by the state over women's
sexuality and mothering, as well as their participation in wage
labor."s
The failure of PRWORA to achieve its stated goals is
attributable to two faulty assumptions that buttressed the new
programs.1" The first mistaken assumption was that single mothers
who are primary caretakers can work outside the home.1" 1 The
second assumption is that single mothers will find work that pays
enough to enable them to support themselves and their children."°2
Unfortunately, both premises have been disproven by the misfortune
indigent single mothers have experienced in their attempts to
become self-sufficient.1 ' Without a job that pays sufficient wages,
welfare mothers are never really free from the external constraints of
poverty: "the TANF program does not offer benefits sufficient to lift
recipients out of poverty, and (despite a strong economy) the
majority of families who have moved off the TANF rolls have
remained in poverty."1 ' Fineman attributes this deficiency of TANF to
antiquated ideologies of the traditional family."0 '
97. Id. (noting "Mhe question of freedom has lain at the heart of the debates over welfare
reform in recent years particularly in the United States").
98. Xue Song, American Poverty and Welfare Reform, 2 PERSP rIVS, No. 6, available
at httpJ/www.oycf.orgPerpectives/12-063001/Americanpovertyreform.htm.
99. Hirschmann, supra note 64, at 84-85.
100. See generally MINK, supra note 10.
101. Heidi Hartmann & Hsiao-ye Yi, The Rhetoric and Reality of Welfare Reform, in
WOMEN & WELFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 160, 161
(Nancy J. Hirschmann & Ulrike Liebert eds., 2001).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 162.
104. Schram & Soss, supra note 36, at 66.
105. Fineman, supra note 75.
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The more significant difficulty with maternal work, however,
is that it is imposed within the ideological confines of the old
order.' Today we may expect that women work even if they are
mothers, but we do so in the context of unchanged, largely
unchallenged, institutions which operate as though workers are free
of domestic responsibilities."7 There may be new expectations about
mothers and market work, but there is no accommodation in the
market for the demands of mothering on workers."l~ Childcare,
meaningful (paid) parental leave, and flexible schedules necessary
to respond to caregiving contingencies are not the workplace
reality for most mothers."°9
Another reason for the failure of TANF involves the misplaced
focus on caseload reduction rather than poverty reduction. Many
policymakers conceive welfare benefits as an either/or proposition:
either poor women are on welfare, or they are making affirmative
steps to work and become financially independent."' As a result of
this dichotomy put forth in the popular rhetoric surrounding
welfare, the myth of the unemployed welfare mother overshadows
the reality that "half of all single mothers who spend any time on
welfare also work in the labor market . . . .""' Encouraging
statistics, such as the decrease in national welfare caseload and
the increase in employment rate for single mothers, obscure the fact
that when former welfare recipients move into the workforce, they
enter jobs with low wages and do not receive work benefits such as
health insurance, paid sick leave, or vacation." 2
Heather Boushey, an economist for the Economic Policy Institute,
regards the 1996 welfare reform as a "de facto contract" with
indigent Americans who do not have jobs." 8 "That contract held
that if the jobless poor would go to work, we would strengthen work
supports to ensure that they and their families would not be left in
privation.""4 As part of the welfare reform plan, social assistance for
indigent mothers is conditional on work-geared education and
employment as well as provisions intended to discourage out-of-
wedlock childbearing."5 While increasing independence and self-
106. Orloff, supra note 12, at 138.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Fineman, supra note 75.
110. Hartmann & Yi, supra note 101, at 161.
111. Id. at 163.
112. Song, supra note 98.
113. Boushey, supra note 19.
114. Id.
115. Orloff, supra note 12, at 149.
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sufficiency is a noble goal, it is difficult to contemplate how
prematurely removing the safety net for poor women advances these
goals when "[tihe jobs available to . . .many former welfare
recipients, do not pay wages high enough to afford a safe and decent
standard of living."1 6 Statistical data supporting this finding is
abundant. For instance, the National Governor's Association
reported in 1998 that those people who left welfare to find jobs
earned between $5.50 and $7.00 an hour, placing the families far
below the federal poverty line."7
Building upon Boushey's contract theme, seven years after the
passage of PRWORA, the government has not lived up to its end of
the bargain."' Although nearly two-thirds of former welfare
recipients left the welfare rolls and entered the labor force, they
found that low wage jobs did not alleviate their impoverished
conditions."' Considering the "often inadequate wages and
intermittent work that characterize the low-wage labor market...
it is unlikely that single mothers can achieve above-poverty incomes
based on their earnings alone."' If indigent women are forced into
low-income jobs in order for their families to subsist, they are
precluded from the possibility of gaining the skills necessary to
remove themselves from the cycle of poverty and dependence.
Quite often, the work available to indigent single mothers is
itinerant at best.12' Those times when steady work is not available
or when circumstances preclude a mother on welfare from working
require some sort of income to "fill the gaps" between jobs."2
Without a reliable income gap filler there is no incentive for a
welfare mother to seek permanent employment."2 The chances of
actually moving out of poverty through low-wage employment are
minute. 24 Receiving a steady subsidized income is a more attractive
option than being left in the cold when the economy does not
116. Boushey, supra note 19.
117. Lisa Dodson, At the Kitchen Table: Poor Women Making Public Policy, in WOMEN &
WELFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 177, 180 (Nancy J.
Hirschmann & Ulrike Liebert eds., 2001).
118. Boushey, supra note 19.
119. Id.
120. Hartmann & Yi, supra note 101,at 165.
121. See generally MINK, supra note 10.
122. Hartmann & Yi, supra note 101, at 174.
123. Id. at 175.
124. See generally id.
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produce jobs. The five year lifetime limit on benefits further
attenuates the relationship between welfare reform and its purported
goal of self-sufficiency."
It appears the adverse socioeconomic position that welfare
mothers experience when they leave the welfare program discourages
their autonomy precisely because they lack any safety net. Some
subsidy provisions are necessary to encourage the goal of giving
indigent mothers the incentive to move from dependency to self-
sufficiency." Hartmann and Yi discuss this point at great length."
They describe the factors related to the higher incidence of poverty
among single mothers: their lack of access to the "income stabilizing
effect" of an additional wage-earner that married couples enjoy, the
generally inadequate amounts of child support from absentee
fathers, and the continued income disparities between male and
female heads of household.12 All of these factors could be alleviated
if the government would be more amenable to allowing poor
mothers to concurrently work and receive welfare benefits. At
this point, it appears the various PRWORA provisions have not
achieved this end, or in Boushey's terms, the contract with indigent
Americans has not been fulfilled.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TANF
It is a recognized constitutional principle that family life
occupies a space in the zone of privacy respected in the American
legal tradition.'" The United States Supreme Court has accorded
special constitutional protection to choices affecting family living
and custodial arrangements, relational rights of parents and
children, and to parents' child-rearing decisions.13 0 The stated
family formation goals of PRWORA expose indigent women to
unconstitutional intrusion into the zone of privacy. Indeed,
125. Id at 174 ("rhe five-year lifetime limit on benefit receipt will work against enabling
women to complete high school or enter college, education they sorely need to increase their
earnings capacity. Time limits may also make it difficult for these women to use welfare as
unemployment insurance ....
126. Id.
127. See generally id
128. Id at 161.
129. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (discussing marriage and
procreation as fundamental rights, integral to human existence, in the context of a
substantive due process challenge to forced sterilization).
130. MINK, supra note 10, at 93 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494
(1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923)).
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PRWORA has been described as "a moral straightjacket, conceived
and enacted to disjoin rights from welfare and... intensify the
disciplinary function of social policies affecting poor women."13 1
One of the purposes of the 1996 welfare reform was to reduce
nonmarital births and promote marriage and two parent families."'
Opponents of the family formation prong of PRWORA argue that
"government involvement in marriage is not appropriate .... .'a
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has ardently defended the
right against unwarranted government intrusion into the family
sphere.'3 ' By singling out poor single mothers for subpar
constitutional protection, welfare law invades fundamental rights
like "procreative liberty, marital freedom, and the right to the care
and custody of one's own children.""s
Mink notes:
Three of the four statutory purposes of welfare policy... involve
promoting marriage rather than mitigating need... tie a single
mother's economic security to her relationship with her child's
father... [and] call upon states to infringe or withhold such
rights as marital privacy, associational liberty, reproductive
choice, and vocational freedom from poor women who are
parenting alone.
1 6
If the government's goal is to decrease out-of-wedlock parenting
and promote two parent families, then aiming programs at poor
mothers unfairly places the onus of family formation responsibilities
on women (poor women in particular), even though single
motherhood occurs almost as frequently among women in higher
economic brackets.137 It leaves poor women subject to government
intrusion in a way that their wealthier counterparts are not.""
Subsequently, TANF should be subject to intermediate
constitutional scrutiny. In King v. Smith,"9 the Supreme Court
found that moralistic state eligibility criteria interfered with the
131. Id. at 66.
132. Id.
133. Song, supra note 98.
134. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
135. MNm, supra note 10, at 76.
136. Id. at 67.
137. Mauldon, supra note 56, at 1.
138. MmNK, supra note 10, at 23.
139. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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statutory purpose of AFDC.14 The statutory purpose of PRWORA,
however, has a strong social prescription purpose, and intrusive
governmental intervention in the lives of poor women actually
comports with this purpose. The statutory purpose of PRWORA is
itself unconstitutional.
The family formation goal also presupposes that welfare
recipients have family values and attitudes falling outside the
accepted norm.141 On the contrary, a study conducted by The Welfare
Reform and Family Formation Project (WRFFP) shows that most
unwed mothers on welfare want to marry, just like their middle
class counterparts." 2 As a result of the findings of this study, the
WRFFP suggests policies encouraging marriage should be refocused
with an eye toward "improving marriage prospects and increasing
family planning access and education for both low-income women
and men."'43
THE CLASH BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND FAMILY
FORMATION GOALS OF PRWORA
In addition to frustrating poor women's exercise of autonomy,
PRWORA is also counterproductive because its provisions actually
force welfare recipients to choose between working and taking care
of their children at home. By enacting PRWORA, policymakers
failed to "remember when considering maternal work as a solution
for poverty that the demands of mothering do not disappear when
women enter the work market."'" While the responsibility for
childcare remains with women of all socioeconomic levels,
presupposing the two parent paradigm, poor women in TANF
programs are compelled to work." If they do not work, they are
considered lazy, although their wealthier counterparts are not
subjected to such stigmatization."6
Rather than a prescriptive welfare law that seeks to alter the
behavior of welfare recipients, a welfare system that recognizes the
harsh realities of postmodern American life is in order. For a welfare
140. MINK, supra note 10, at 50.
141. Mauldon, supra note 56, at 3.
142. Id. at 7 (explaining the results of the study, "itihe reasons for low rates of
marriage and high rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing in this population appear not to
be linked to fundamental desires for these outcomes: our findings show that welfare
recipients' family values and aspirations closely resemble those of other women").
143. Id.
144. Fineman, supra note 75, at 36.
145. See Orloff, supra note 12, at 138.
146. See generally Hartmann & Yi, supra note 101.
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program to be viable and encourage women's autonomy,
policymakers must acknowledge the facts: "families have
disintegrated. Divorce rates are high. More children are being born
outside of wedlock. Fewer people are marrying, and fewer women are
having children. People are living longer ... and the traditional
system of care and support provided by the heterosexual child-
raising family unit is no longer sufficient."147
It is not inherently objectionable for the government to take
steps to encourage a particular form of family formation it deems
efficacious for economic reasons. It is quite dubious, however, to use
family formation goals as a criterion for poor women to receive
benefits for work that actually serves a purpose, though it goes
unrecognized. Welfare policy should merely recognize and alleviate
the need it seeks to address, namely the economic viability of poor
families. To predicate assistance on conforming to the government's
family structure prescriptions would turn impoverished mothers
into wards of the federal government. Programs encouraging
marriage and decreasing out-of-wedlock childbearing may be
instituted, but they should be disaggregated from the benefits
indigent women receive. Disaggregating the economic and the social
goals would satisfy both goals without offending traditional notions
of privacy and the relationship between citizens and the
government. A welfare model that may achieve this goal is one with
minimal requirements and constraints imposed on recipients. In
order to receive benefits, women should be required to show that
they are engaging in either caregiving work or traditional, outside-
the-home work.
CONCLUSION
PRWORA made poor single mothers' attempts to make ends
meet more difficult by forcing them to decide between caregiving and
breadwinning, without providing adequate safety nets to balance the
two duties. Caregiving is not a job that society values as a legitimate
economic activity.' PRWORA reflected this ethic by forcing
caregiving mothers into work with grossly inadequate career skills.'4 9
Because of this skill deficiency, the jobs welfare mothers are forced
to take typically do not cover the cost of childcare necessary to make
the decision to work a viable one. The negative effects of welfare
147. MINK, supra note 10, at 10.
148. See generally Hartmann & Yi, supra note 101.
149. Id.
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reform are largely attributable to the overemphasis of the moral
objective, which resulted in policy that aimed to reduce the caseload
rather than truly assist welfare recipients. While self-sufficiency is
a noble goal, one that improves a citizen's ability to participate in
the American democracy, it is a goal that requires more robust safety
nets than those provided for by TANF. As the Congressional debate
over reauthorizing PRWORA rages on, largely without the
participation of welfare recipients, one can only hope that the welfare
reform debate undergoes a serious change in focus, resulting in a
welfare policy capable of securing economic viability and personal
autonomy for indigent single mothers.
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